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[3] Associations-Intervention of Courts-In Case of Expulsion.Courts
different ru]ps of law
to review of
ll1
depending
particular group
and character and
extent of member's interest.
[ 4] Religious and Charitable Societies-Internal Affairs-Jurisdiction of Civil Courts.-Courts are reluctant to interfere with
organizations with respect to their
internal
and expulsion of member
proper tribunal
of such an association will not be reviewed where no property
is involved.
[5] !d.-Internal Affairs-Members-Expulsion.-A
orneed not adhere to strict requirements imposed in
proceedings, and form of procedure used in cancellation
of membership is immaterial if there has been substantial
compliance with rules of group and accused member has been
afforded reasonable opportunity to defend himself.
[6] !d.-Internal Affairs-Members-Expulsion.-Evidence is sufficient to permit inference that cancellation of plaintiff's
membership in religious organization was made in good faith
where provision was made in rules of organization for elimi-·
nation of discord by permitting member causing dissension
to be removed by majority vote, where plaintiff made number
of suggestions which were disturbing to another member and
dh·ector of organization and his retention as a member would
tend to disrupt its harmonious operation, where he urged
removal of general manager of organization and employment
of himself as manager, and where he proposed to make California his headquarters for solicitation of funds for missionary
work and to "channel" money collected through the organization, though solicitation of money for such purpose was
contrary to plan of founders of organization.
[7] !d.-Internal Affairs-Members-Expulsion.-Written request
of a founder of religious organization that plaintiff be
elected a director, presented after such founder's death,
does not prevent termination of plaintiff's membership in
organization where, assuming that such request had any binding effect, it cannot be reasonably construed as exempting
plaintiff from provision of by-laws authorizing cancellation
of membership.

[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Associations and Clubs, § 16; Am.Jur., Associations and Clubs, § 17 et seq.
[ 4] Suspension or expulsion from church or religious society
and remedies therefor, note, 20 A.L.R.2d 421. See also Cal.Jur.,
Religious and Charitable Societies, § 13; Am.Jur., Religious Societies, § 59 et seq.

Oct.

ERICKSON

v. GosPEL PouNDAnox

OF

CAr,w.

583

[43 C.2d 581; 275 P.2d 474]

Court of I-'os

APPEAL from
Angeles County.

Affirmed.

for defendant

Action for
affirmed.
,John \V l'rec;ton and

Choate for

Gibson, Dmw & Crutcher, Sherman vVelpton, Jr., and
Leslie G. Tnnwr for Hesponclents.
GIBSON, C. ,J.--The membership of plaintiff in defendant
Uospel lhnmd.ation of California was cancelled by vote of
the members, and he brought this aetion for deelaratory
relief to determine the validity of the caueellation. Plaintiff
joiued as defendants Mary Liddeeoat and Norman E. Johnson, who al'e both member:;; and direetors of the Foundation,
Selma C. Abnot, who was elected a member and director in
plaintiff's place, and \Valter E. \Vebb, the general manager.
He lms appealed from a judgment declaring that his membership was Yalidly caneellrd and annulled.
The Poundation is a nonprofit eorporation formed in 1946
under the laws of California. Its purpose is to foster, promote
and operate religious, charitable, evangelistic and mission
entPrprises, ami Hl('Jll bers are required to subscribe to a doetrinal statement which eonsists of tenets of a solely religious
nature.
The authorized number of members of the F'oundation is
the same as the number of directors, which is fixed at three,
and the personnel of the membership and directorship is
identical. No member is to obtain any pecuniary gain or
profit, awl in the event of dissolution the property of the
Poundatiou is not to go to tlw members but to certain named
organizations.
The by-laws provide that every member is entitled to one
vote and, ill <tddition, shall have one vote for each $1,000
in mmtey or property conveyed to and aceepted by the
F'oundation and that all contributions shall be subject to
approvaL and aeecptance by a majority of the votes of the
members. It is further provided that a membership may
be cancf'llr•d and annuHed by a majority vote.
The original members and direetors wrre A. lVL Johnson,
Mary Liddeeoat and Norman Johnson. In December, 1947,
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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annulment of his
votes in favor of
such action.
Plaintiff
an additional vote to a member for each contribution of
$1,000
the l<'oundation. His attack is based
upon the claim that there is
one class of members in
the Foundation and that the statutes
equal voting
rights for all members of one class in a nonprofit corporation.
At the time the l<'oundation was incorporated and this by-law
was adopted the applicable statutes provided as follows: 'The
authorized number and
of its members, the
if any, the
voting,
of each class of membership,
and
may be set forth either in the
§
subd. 5, now
The
''may
contain, among other
for: .
(9) The
qualifications of members and different classes of memberships, and the
and other
interests
or
of each dass." ( Civ.
§
m
§ 9402, snbd. b.) ''A nonprofit corporation
shall have such
classes thereof as may be
in the articles or
but unless otherwise
provided there shall be but one class of members whose
rights and interests shall be
§ 600, 1st
par., reenacted as
'Unless otherwise
in the articles or
every member of a nonshall be entitled to one vote and may vote
. . . No member may cumulate his votes
in the articles or
now embodied in
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[1]

provide for
ferent classes. 'l'he
authorization because
of membership, with
for each
based upon the amount of contributions made
individual
nwmbers and
the Poundation. It
<''·lually among the members of each
and we find uv""""""'
arbitrary or unreasonable in its application. [2]
claimed
plaintiff, does the
violate section 9500*
the Corporations Code, which relates to the powers to be
exercised by directors. The
affects only the rights
of the members as such and does not regulate their powers
as directors. The three directors have equal voting powers
when acting in that capacity.
Plaintiff next attacks the cancellation of his membership
by asserting that no charges were filed against him, that he
was given no opportunity to be heard in his defense and
that under such circumstances the action taken was arbitrary
and capricious. [3] The courts have
different
rules of law relating to review of the action of an organization in expelling a member, depending on the nature of the
particular group involved and the character and extent of
the member's interest. For example, it has been held that
one may not be expelled from an organization such as a labor
union or a mutual benefit society, where property rights are
attached to membership, without notice and a reasonable
opportunity to defend against the charges made. (Cason v.
Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 37 Cal.2d 134, 142 et seq. [231
P.2d 6]; 1'aboada v. Sociedad Espanola de Beneficencia Mutua, 191 CaL 187, 191 et seq. [215 P.
27 A.L.R. 1508] .)
[ 4] The courts have always been reluctant to interfere with
actions taken by religious organizations with respect to their
internal affairs, and it has been commonly held that the
expulsion of a member by a proper tribunal of such an association will not be reviewed where no property right is
involved. (See Bouldin v. Alexander, 15 Wall. (U.S.) 131,
139-140 [21 L.Ed. 69] ; First English L. Church v. Evangelical
L. Synod, 135 F.2d 701, 703; Mount Olive Primitive Baptist
*Section 9500 of the Corporations Code provides: ''Except as otherwise provided by the articles of incorporation or the by-laws, the powers
of a nonprofit corporation shall be exercised, its property controlled,
and its affairs conducted by a board of not less than three directors.''

C.2d

('llurch v. Patrick, 2;)2 Ala. 672
f:)o.2(1 lil7, 618-GID I;
Ballew v. Deal, 20D Uu. GO~l [70 S ..BJ.2d 7G7. 7G8-7GD]; Kauf}'man v. Plank, 214 lll.App. >lOG, :no; King v. 8111
JOG Kall.
624 [J89 P 147, 148]; Jenkins v. New Shiloh Bapt·ist
Church, J89 .i\ld. 512 [[56 A.2cl
79J; Murr v. Jl.!a:x;IDcll, (Jio.J\piJ.) 2J2 S.W.2d
232-2!37; Lced8 Y. liar
D ~'LJ. 202
A.2c1 71:l, 718-7JDI; 20 AL.R2d
4:)1 et seq.)
The Ponll(laiion is a rl'ligions
and
cou<:cde(lly has JHJ property rigb ts in it. His relationship
to it, however, differ" in some respeets from that of an onlimu·y
ehur<:h member. As we hav(' seen, the membership of the
:B'oumlation is limite<l to three, and plaintiff was ill a position to <·xert mueh greater iniiuene<~ on the management of
the ail' airs of the group !han eould be exercisPd by a member
of a eongregation 1vhieh is unlimited in size. Moreover, the
perw11nd of the membership awl directorship of the Fuumlation is identical, alld plaintiff ceased to be a director IYhen
he was expelled as a member. A few eourts have held that
the action of a religious body in expelling an officer, snch
as a trustee, may be~ reviP\Yed to the extent of determining
whether there bas been notiee and hearing, whether the
procedural rules of the organization have been follo·wed, and
whether the action \Yas taken in good faith. (See Dittemore
"·Dickey, 249 Mass. 95 [144 XE. 57]; In re Koch, 257 N.Y.
:318 [J78 K.E. ;)4;"5, 546].) This it> apparently the minority
view, and we uecd not determine whether it should be follovYed
in this state, becanse, if we assume it to be the eorrect rule,
the record in this ease shows eompliauce with the requirements.
It appears that on .April 26, Hl50, Miss I,iclclecoat gave
plaintiff a notiee of eaneellation of his membership and a
letter of explanation referring to eonduet on hif'; part \rhieh
had disturbed her. She harl a lengthy conversation with
him, and it ma;' be inferred that they diseussed the matters
whid1 eauscd her concern and that he fully understood th,,
objections to his eoncluet. At Jhat time plaintiff told Miss
IJidde(~oat. that he had reeeiYed 110 notiee of a meeting ealletl
to eousiclcr termination of his membership. Thereafter the
seeretary gave plaintiff written notiee that a speeial meeting
of members wonld be held in California on Augnst 21, ] 950.
to eonsi(l.er the eaneellation of his membership. Plaintiff
attended the meeting, after being assured that he 1vould be
pai(l his expenses in traveling from his home in Chieago. The
miuutes show that .M:iss Liddeeoat read a prepared statement
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which recited ·what had been done in April with respect to
plaintiff's expulsion, and it may be inferred that the statement, whieh is not in the record, referred to the grounds
for his expulsion. 1\Iiss J_.~iddecoat, as president, called for
a \'Ote upon the cancellation of plaintiff's membership, and
he was expellrd by a majority of thr votes rast. Plaintifi
did not Yote, and, although the minutes state that he was
not allowPd to Yote, l\1iss TJiddccoat testified that th('re was
no effort to restrain him from speaking or registering his disapproval. During the mreting be remained silent and made
uo attempt to oppose the action.
[5] An organization such as the Foundation need not
adher(' to th0 strict requirements imposed in legal proceedings. and the form of procedure used is immaterial if there
has bf'en substantial compliance with the rules of the group
and thr aec11Sed membrr has been afforded a reasonable
opportunity to drfend himself. (See Cason v. Glass Bottle
Blowers Assn .. 37 Cal.2d 134, 143 [231 P.2d 6] .) The rules
of the Foundation wrre followed with respect to the August
meeting at whicl1 plaintiff's membership was cancelled, and
tlw evidence shows that the grounds urged for his expulsion
Wf'I'P fully Pxplained to him prior to the meeting and that
he had ample opportunity to be heard.
[6] 'l'hr evidf'nce is elf'arly sufficient to permit an infereueP that the Paneellation of plaintiff's membership was
made in good faith. It is apparent that the founders of the
organization \Yere of the opinion that harmony among the
membrrs was essential to the accomplishmf'nt of the purposes
of the F'oundation, and provision was made for the elimina1 io11 of discord by permitting a member causing dissension
to be rrmoved by majority vote. Plaintiff made a number
of suggest ions whiel1 Wf're disturbing to Miss Liddecoat, and
it appears that his retf'ntion as a member would tend to disrupt the harmonious operation of the Foundation. There
was eyirlence that his actions in and out of the meetings
Wf're inconsistent, and certain of his proposals appear to
justify 'Miss IJiddeeoat 's conclusion that there was "a lot of
self-interest" in the suggestions which he made concerning
the operation of the association. During meetings he made
faYorable comments on the way in which Mr. Webb, who was
acting as general manager, conducted the affairs of the
l<"mm<1ation, but outside the meetings he urged the removal
of \VPbb alld the employment of himself as manager. He
sought to purchase part of a ranch owned by the Foundation
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and to
a
which had been made by
the Foundation to secure operating funds. Plaintiff held
services in Chicago and had a radio program in
Des 1\foinrs through which he solicited funds to carry on
work in South America. He proposed to make
Califomia the
for the solicitation of funds and
to ''channel' the money collected
the Foundation.
Plaintiff
that
Foundation be used for
the solicitato the
tion of money was
to the plan of the founders. His
of course, be deemed inappropriate to one in
his
and
well have tended to create disharmony
and to interfere with the peaceful operation of the Foundation. The trial court could reasonably conclude that the
cancellation of plaintiff's membership was made in good faith
with the honest belief that it would be in the best interests
of the Foundation.
[7] We come finally to plaintiff's contention that a written
request by A. M. J obnson that plaintiff be elected a director
and that he have active management in case of the death of
Miss Liddecoat was binding on the Foundation and prevented
the termination of plaintiff's membership. This request was
in a paper which remained in A.M. Johnson's files until after
his death and was then presented at the special meeting at
which plaintiff was elected a director. Even if we should
assume that the request had any binding effect, it cannot
be reasonably construed as exempting plaintiff from the
provision of the by-laws authorizing cancellation of membership.
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, .J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I agree with the holding that the giving of unequal voting
rights in a nonprofit corporation is authorized by the California corporation law statutes and cannot, therefore, be
declared to be against public policy, and also that A. M.
Johnson's declaration of intention does not affect the present
controversy. But I think this court should hold that a
member of such a corporation may not be removed as such
without cause or hearing. The by-laws here involved, while
seemingly authorizing such, should be interpreted to mean
that cause and hearing are required.
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While it is true
for the
9608),
with
associations as summarized
this court in Cason v. Glass
Bottle Blmoers
37 Cal.2d
143
P.2d 6] : "In
cases of this
the
of individual members and to avoid
the union to govern itself. The courts will
the decision of an association
one of its members
if the rules of the association
expulsion have not
been observed or if the accused member has not been afforded
those rudimentary rights which will give him a reasonable
opportunity to defend against the
made . . . . It is a
fundamental principle
that no man may be condernned or prejttdiced in his rights without an opportunity
to make his defense, and this principle is applicable not only
to courts but also to labor unions and s·imilar organizations .
. . . It is, of course, true that the refined and technical practices which have developed in the courts cannot be imposed
upon the deliberations of workingmen, and the form of procedure is ordinarily immaterial if the accused is accorded a
fair trial. . . . The union's procedure, however, must be such
as will afford the accused member substantial justice, and
the requirements of a fair tr"ial will be imposed even though
the rules of the ·union fail to provide therefor . . . . The
authorities recognize that such a trial includes the right to
notice of the charges, to confront and cross-examine the
accusers, and to examine and refute the evidence." (Emphasis added; see also Taboada v. Sociedad Egpanola de
Beneficencia Mutua, 191 Cal. 187 [215 P. 673, 27 A.L.R.
1508] ; Otto v.
Tailors' P. &; B. Union, 75 Cal.
308 [17 P. 217,7 Am.St.Rep. 156]; VonArx v. San Francisco
G. Vercin, 113 Cal. 377 [45 P. 685]; McConville v. Milk
Wagon Drivers' Union, 106 Cal.App. 696 [289 P. 852];
Ellis v. American Fed. of Labor, 48 Cal.App.2d 440 [120
P.2d 79] ; Knights of The Ku Klux Klan v. Franc1:s, 79 Cal.
App. 383 [249 P. 539]; Grand Grove etc. of Druids v. Garibaldi Grove etc. of Dntids, 105 Cal. 219 [38 P. 947] ; Supreme
Lodge of The World v. Los Angeles Lodge No. 386, 177 Cal.
132 [169 P. 1040]; Grand Grove etc. of Druids v. Garibaldi
Grove, 130 Cal. 116 [62 P. 486, 80 Am.St.Rep. 80]; De Mille
v. Arner·ican Fed. of Radio Artists, 31 Cal.2d 139, 155 [187
P.2d 769, 175 A.L.R. 382]; Lawson v. Hewell, 118 Cal. 613
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[50 P. 768, 49 hR.A. 400]; Smith v. Il.ern County 111edical
Assn., 19 Cal.2d 268 [120 P.2d 874]; Haynes v. Annandale
Oolf Cl1tb, 4 Cal.2d 28 [47 P.2d 470, 99 A.L.B. 1439], incorporated association; 21 A.L.R.2d 1897; 20 A.L.R2d 844,
536; 37 Yale hJ. 368; 43 Harv.hReY. 993; 58 Yale L.J. 999.)
Moreover, it has been said: "The proceedings of the society,
in order to be regular and legal, in
therefore,
provide for notice to the accused and afford him an opportunity to be heard. . .
''Indeed, it has been held that even though the by-laws
expressly provide for the expuls·ion of a member withotd a
trial such a provision is void and an expulsion in pttrsuance
of such a by-law is not binding . . . .
"It has been held that in the absence of by-laws covering
the subject that a member is entitled to a fair trial after due
notice and that the procedure in such cases is to be analogous
to ordinary judicial proceedings so far as necessary to render
substantial justice." (Emphasis added; Taboada v. Sociedad
Espanola de Beneficencia Mutna, supra, 191 Cal. 187, 191.)
'rhe majority seems to intimate that there are no civil or
property rights here involved and the Foundation is a religious organization and the courts will not interfere with
its ecclesiastical affairs.
There can be no question that here property and civil
rights are involved. "While the members have no interest
in the corporate assets, they as directors may receive a fee
and expenses for attending meetings and their prestige and
community standing may be adversely affected by a cancellation of their membership. Plaintiff was engaged independently in missionary and religious activities similar to
those of the Foundation. By his arbitrary expulsion his
;,tanding and ability to carry on those activities will be
affected. 'I'hese may be "personal rights" but they are
important. "When we turn aside from the authorities and
consider the actual human interests which suffer from an
expulsion, it becomes apparent that in many cases they are
chiefly interests of personality. The expelled club member
finds his social reputation blasted, and is likely to be blackballed by other desirable clubs. The former trade unionist
is ostracized by union members. A student like Shelley who
has b2en excluded from college is branded for years to come,
and deprived of intimate associations with places and companions. Excommunication from a church means loss of the
opportunity to worship God in familiar surroundings with

Oet.
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a cherished ritual, and inflicts upon the devout believer loneliness of spirit and perhaps the dread of eternal damnation.
In comparison \Yith such emotional deprivations, mere losses
of property often appear triviaL It would seem natural that
courts of eq nity should consider the desirability of remedying
sueh injuries to personality, but they are hindered from
so
the oft-repeated doctrine that equity protects
only property rights. Dean Pound and others have shown
the uns11 bstantial basis of this doctrine in the older cases,
and its unfortunate effect in restricting the ability of courts
to remedy many of the evils of modern life. Injunctions
and similar flexible remedies of equity are much better suited
than a speculative action for damages to protect interests
of peesonality when the injuries to them are sufficiently
serious to \rarraut the interference of the courts. The trend
of the ckeisions today is toward such protection, even in
1he courts of last resort, and an examination of unreported
eases iu the lower courts collected from newspapers indicates
that suc:h courts are willing to go farther than the appellate
judges in frankly protecting interests of personality.'' ( 43
IIan.hReY. 998.) It is settled in this state that equity will
protect pnrely pr>rsonal rights, hence the obstacle mentioneu
in the abon' quotation is removed. (Orloff v. Los Angeles
Turf Club, 30 Cal.2d 110 [180 P.2d 321, 171 A.L.R 913].)
There is, therefore, no reason why plaintiff's rights here
should not be protected.
As heretofore pointed out there are civil and property
rights here involved and there are no ecclesiastical disputes
of any Teind. 'l'here are no questions of whether the correct
creed or tenets are being followed or what such creeds are.
It is simply a matter of whether a member of a nonprofit
eorporation may be removed without cause and hearing. This
r'mlrt sairl in Rosicnwian Fellowship v. Rosicrucian etc.
Cluo·cll, 39 CaL2d 121, 131 [245 P.2c1 481]: "The general
nil1• that courts will llOt interfere in religious societies with
rcferenee to their ecclesiastical practices stems from the
sr>paration o£ the church and state, but has always been
qualified by the rule that civil and property rights would
be adjnclieatcl1. . . . \Yhcther an activity is ecclesiastical or
involves property rights, especially when a deeision on one
neee.~sarily involves consideration of the other, are difficult
q nest ions. Ecclesiastical matters include in the main, creeds
and proper modes of exercising one's belief. \Vhile the
principle that courts will not purport to exercise ecclesiastical
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is settled as an abstract
they will
determine civil and
which depend essentially
as evinced
regulations,
on the contraets of thr
and customs
and followed.'' Substantial
authorities have stated that courts have jurisdiction to review
the
of a member of a
organization to
determine if it ·was in accordance with natural
North Clinton
75 N.J.L. 167
257 N.Y. 318 [178 N.E. 545]; Fair118 Misc. 639 [195 N.Y.S. 39] ; Gray
137 Mass. 329 [50
310);
v. Hellenic Orthodox Soc., 261 Mass. 462 [159
Rock Dell Norwegian Evan. L. Congregatwn v.
174 Minn. 207 [219 N.W. 88] .) They stress that
the by-laws are not to be construed to permit an expulsion
unless absolutrly neeessary. 'l'he court said in Gray v. Christian
supra, 137 Mass. 329, 331 : "The necessity of
eomplying with these requirements of common justice [hearing] has been so uniformly asserted, that only a few cases
need be
in addition to those last referred to, to show
how unwilling courts have been to admit that charters, by-laws,
or rules could be intended to deprive a man of his membership
without a hearing.'' This is especially true in the instant
case where there is no question of religious belief or practices.
The situation is the same as if a social elub or nonprofit
corporation is involved. The rules are stated with supporting
authority: ''One of the bases for court action as to an
expulsion from a club is the fact that it was in violation
of the principles of natural justice. . . .
''One of the denials of natural justice which will base
court interference is that of a fair hearing or fair trial. . . .
"It has been held that a hearing must be afforded by the
group exercising the expulsory power in all proceedings
which may result in loss of property, position, or character,
regardless of whether its committee has previously accorded
a hearing and of whether the accused demands it, and the
expulsion of a member without affording him a hearing is
void. . . .
" [I.1] ack of proper notice to the accused member of hearing
or trial is another violation of the principles of natural
justice upon the basis of which court action may take
place . . . .
"It is generally held that a member against whom expulsion
proceedings are brought is entitled to notice of the charge
against him, . . .
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or other
him would be invalid as
notiee tlwt a member's
actions
to be
The
and
and tlwre was cause for dismissal
evidence. 'I'he trial court made no clear-cut "'"""'"'"'
first
and this court should not in effect make one
as the evidence is capable of different constructions. There
was no
at the meetings at which plaintiff was expelled that a hearing was being held to consider
No charges were made nor evidence
at those
The only thing done was the taking of a vote on the
of expulsion. To justify its position that there was cause
for plaintiff's expulsion the majority relies on evidence
i ntrodueed at the trial of the action. 'l'o have a proper
hearing, there should have been a charge and notice of a
hearing thPreon and evidence should have been given at the
hearing and directed to the board members. In other wo:rds
plaintiff was entitled to know the nature of the charge
against him and the time and place fixed for a hearing thereon
t,o that he might be prepared to meet any evidence presented
in support of such charge. If no such evidence was pre~
sented, the charge must necessarily fail. Here there was no
eharge, notiee, hearing or evidence as a basis for plaintiff's
expulsion. The fact that evidence was presented at the trial
of the action brought for the purpose of nullifying the invalid
expulsion order does not give such order validity.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a
24, 1954. Carter, J., was of
should be

